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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
Nos. 07-1554 and 07-1726
__________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
GEORGE D. WALLS,
                                                 Appellant
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal Nos. 04-cr-00001J
                             and 92-cr-00002J)
 District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson
__________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on July 3, 2008
Before:  RENDELL, SMITH, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: September 3, 2008)
__________
OPINION OF THE COURT
__________
    Walls’ term of supervised release carried with it, as a mandatory condition, a1
requirement that he “not commit another federal, state, or local crime” during the term of
supervision.  (App. 23, 25.)
    At the revocation hearing, Walls stipulated to committing the crime of theft by2
deception/forgery in violation of Pennsylvania law and in violation of the terms of his
supervised release.  Walls does not challenge that aspect of the District Court’s revocation
order.
2
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Appellant George D. Walls (“Walls”) appeals the District Court’s order revoking
his terms of supervised release.  After conducting a revocation hearing pursuant to
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2), the District Court found that Walls
violated a condition of his release by, inter alia, committing the crimes of sexual assault
and indecent assault in violation of Pennsylvania state law.   1
On appeal, Walls argues that the District Court erred in (1) conducting the
revocation hearing without giving him an opportunity to confront and/or cross examine
the individual whom he was convicted in state court of assaulting and (2) finding that
there was sufficient evidence to prove that he committed the crimes of assault for which
he was convicted.   We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  For the reasons2
stated below, we will affirm.
    As we write solely for the benefit of the parties, who are familiar with the facts and3
procedural history of this case, we confine our discussion to the legal issues presented and
include only those facts necessary to our disposition.
3
DISCUSSION3
I.  Opportunity to Confront Adverse Witness
Walls first argues that his revocation hearing was inherently flawed, as the District
Court did not require the individual whom he was convicted of assaulting to appear and
testify.  Walls asks that we overturn the District Court’s revocation order and remand his
case for a new hearing. 
Pursuant to Rule 32.1(b)(2), a defendant is entitled to, inter alia, “an opportunity
to appear, present evidence, and question any adverse witness unless the court determines
that the interest of justice does not require the witness to appear.”  Fed. R. Crim. P.
32.1(b)(2)(C) (emphasis added).  The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 32.1 state that
subsection (b)(2)(C) “recognize[s] that the court should apply a balancing test at the
hearing itself when considering the releasee’s asserted right to cross-examine adverse
witnesses.  The court is to balance the person’s interest in the constitutionally guaranteed
right to confrontation against the government’s good cause for denying it.”  See also
United States v. Williams, 443 F.3d 35, 45 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Rondeau, 430
F.3d 44, 48 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Taveras, 380 F.3d 532, 536 (1st Cir. 2004);
United States v. Martin, 382 F.3d 840, 844-845 (8th Cir. 2004).  Though Walls himself
acknowledges this as the correct standard, he contends that neither the “interest of
    We do not modify “victim” with the term “alleged,” as the Walls’ state criminal jury4
trial resulted in a conviction. 
4
justice” nor “good cause” justified the Government’s failure to produce his victim  at the4
revocation hearing. 
We review the District Court’s application of the Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) balancing test
for an abuse of discretion.  United States v. Williams, 443 F.3d 35, 46 (2d Cir. 2006). 
“Abuse of discretion encompasses clearly erroneous findings of fact and misapplications
of law.”  Id.  
In concluding that it was not necessary for the individual whom Walls was
convicted of assaulting to appear and testify at his revocation hearing, the District Court
relied heavily on the fact that the victim had already been “examined and cross-examined
during the state prosecution of the Defendant.”  (App. 32.)  Though the Court
acknowledged Walls’ many challenges to the victim’s credibility, it nonetheless “d[id] not
see the value of re-examining another witness from the state criminal trial, in addition to
the Defendant.” (App. 32-33.)  The Court explained:
[T]he Defendant uses as support for his [credibility] argument[s] portions of
the state trial transcript from other duly sworn and competent witnesses who
already testified, but would have the Court preside over a second
examination, in a supervised release proceeding, of a complaining witness
from the state criminal prosecution.  To single out the Defendant and the
complaining witness from the state criminal prosecution for purposes of
having this Court engage in an exercise of judging the credibility of the two
appears to be a selective recognition of the credibility of the trial witnesses. 
(App. 33).   
    Walls himself acknowledges this fact in his brief.  (See Appellant’s Br. 38 (“The5
district court based its revocation of Mr. Walls’ supervised release upon his state court
convictions for indecent assault and sexual assault.”).)
    The Government introduced a transcript of the victim’s sworn state court testimony.6
5
In light of the District Court’s stated reasoning, we cannot say that it abused its
discretion in failing to require Walls’ victim to appear and testify at his revocation
hearing.  Further, as the District Court explicitly stated in its Memorandum Opinion, its
decision to revoke Walls’ supervised release was “based upon the evidence of the [state
court] convictions”  (App. 30), and the Court addressed the state criminal trial testimony5
of Walls’ victim only “for the sake of completeness” (id.).   Thus, even were we to6
determine that the District Court abused its discretion in permitting Walls’ revocation
hearing to proceed without the testimony of his victim—which we do not—the error
would only be reversible if the alternate basis for the District Court’s holding (i.e., the
evidence of the state court convictions) could not sustain the revocation of Walls’
supervised release.  We turn next to that precise question. 
II.  Sufficiency of the Evidence
As his second issue on appeal, Walls challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
underlying the District Court’s decision to revoke his supervised release.  The District
Court found that the certified copy of Walls’ state court convictions for sexual assault and
indecent assault was sufficient evidence to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the
    A supervised release violation must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, not7
beyond a reasonable doubt.  18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3); United States v. Dees, 467 F.3d 847,
854-55 (3d Cir. 2006).  As we explained in United States v. Poellnitz, 372 F.3d 562, 566
(3d Cir. 2004):
A court can revoke probation when it is reasonably satisfied that the
probation conditions have been violated, without the government being
required to present proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the alleged acts.  In other words, to revoke probation it is not
necessary that the probationer be adjudged guilty of a crime, but only that
the court be reasonably satisfied that he has violated one of the conditions.
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
    Because Walls’ challenge is “essentially legal in nature,” our review is de novo. 8
Poellnitz, 372 F.3d at 565 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
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evidence,  that Walls violated a term of his release by committing two state crimes.  (App.7
25-30.)  Walls contends that the District Court should not have considered his state court
convictions as evidence that he violated his release conditions.  Specifically, Walls argues
that, because his convictions were the result of a jury verdict, and not an admission of
guilt, they “do[] not prove that a crime was actually committed.”  (Appellant’s Br. 39
(emphasis in original).)  According to Walls, the “continual maintenance of his innocence
alone make [sic] the convictions an inadequate basis upon which to revoke his supervised
release.”  (Appellant’s Br. 40.)  In support of this contention, Walls cites only one case: 
United States v. Poellnitz, 372 F.3d 562 (3d Cir. 2004).   8
In Poellnitz, the defendant was subject to the same supervised release condition as
Walls, prohibiting him from committing any crimes “federal, state, or local” during the
7term of his release.  Id. at 564.  Prior to the expiration of his term, Poellnitz was arrested
and charged with a number of state crimes to which he eventually pleaded nolo
contendere.  Id.  Relying on his state court convictions, the District Court revoked
Poellnitz’s supervised release, and Poellnitz appealed.  Upon review, we held that
Poellnitz’s nolo contendere plea, without more, was insufficient to establish that he
violated a condition of his supervised release.  We explained that, under Pennsylvania
law, “[i]n pleading nolo contendere; the defendant does not admit his guilt, but merely
consents to being punished as if he were guilty,” id. at 568 (internal quotation marks
omitted); accordingly, we concluded, “a nolo plea . . . has no evidentiary value in
assessing whether the defendant committed a crime” id. at 567.  
Walls takes our discussion of nolo contendere pleas in Poellnitz and seeks to
extend it to the facts of his case.  Walls argues that, because his convictions were the
result of a jury verdict “to which [he] did not acquiesce” (Appellant’s Br. 38), there exists
no factual admission of guilt, and thus, “Poellnitz . . . dictates that the jury’s verdict . . .
cannot be considered evidence of [his] guilt of the underlying conduct” (Appellant’s Br.
39).  Unfortunately for Walls, Poellnitz dictates no such conclusion and, in fact, supports
the opposite.
To be clear, at the outset of our opinion in Poellnitz, we recognized that “[i]n the
normal course, one might expect that if the court finds [that the] defendant was convicted
of a crime, the court may automatically revoke release based on the defendant’s
    On June 18, 2004, Walls was granted a new trial by order of the Court of Common9
Pleas of Allegheny County based on his claim that he had not been given a fair trial due
to a hearing impairment that had not adequately been accommodated by the trial court. 
8
commission of the underlying offense[, but t]hat is not so when it comes to the peculiar
legal effect of the plea of nolo contendere.”  Thus, our holding in Poellnitz was based on
the “peculiar” nature of a nolo contendere plea, which is fundamentally different than a
guilty verdict rendered upon the conclusion of a trial by jury.   
Ultimately, “[w]hat matters is whether [the defendant] committed [a] crime as a
matter of fact.”  Id. at 567.  And while a plea of nolo contendere is not evidence of the
fact that the pleader actually committed a crime, a jury verdict of guilty is itself a finding
of fact.  As stated by the District Court, “[n]o attorney or court can dispute that it is the
function of the jury to resolve factual issues at trial and the jury in state court found
[Walls] guilty of sexual assault and indecent assault using the standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. . . . The jury finding [that Walls was] guilty of both crimes establishes
that [Walls] committed the offenses of sexual assault and indecent assault.”  (App. 27.) 
We agree.  The standard of proof employed by the jury in convicting Walls of sexual and
indecent assault is significantly higher than the standard of proof necessary to sustain the
revocation of his release.  Accordingly, evidence of Walls’ convictions is more than
sufficient to sustain the District Court’s order in this case.  
The fact that Walls is pursuing a collateral appeal of his convictions does not
change our conclusion.   The case of Roberson v. Connecticut, 501 F.2d 305 (2d Cir.9
The ruling was appealed, and on November 3, 2005, the Pennsylvania Superior Court
reversed the decision and the order for a new trial was vacated.  Walls now pursues a
collateral attack upon his state convictions based on ineffective assistance of counsel.  
9
1974), is instructive.  In that case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that evidence
of a criminal conviction is sufficient to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the defendant violated the terms of his probation even in light of a pending direct appeal. 
In doing so, the Court reasoned:
[a] criminal conviction after a trial at which the probationer was entitled to
all the protections afforded a criminal defendant including formal rules of
evidence, the right to assigned counsel if indigent, and the requirement that
the state establish guilty beyond a reasonable doubt certainly affords a more
than sufficient basis for revocation of probation, even if that conviction is
still awaiting appellate review.
Id. at 308; see also United States v. Spraglin, 418 F.3d 479 (5th Cir. 2005) (involving
revocation of supervised release); United States v. Fleming, 9 F.3d 1253 (7th Cir. 1993)
(same).  We find the Second Circuit’s reasoning to be persuasive and thus apply it here.
As did the District Court, we “see[] no reason to treat convictions that are subject
to a pending direct appeal differently than convictions that are subject to a collateral
attack when determining if a conviction can be a basis to revoke a term of supervised
release.”  (App. 30.)  Thus, even in light of his collateral attack, we conclude that Walls’
state court convictions were sufficient to justify the District Court’s revocation of his
supervised release.  Accordingly, we will affirm. 
10
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we will AFFIRM the judgment of the District
Court.
